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Abstract:  In this essay we shall be concerned with the real world relevance of theories of international law; that 
is, with the question of the theories themselves as a factor in international decision-making. To do this it is first 
necessary to review briefly the substance of the jurisprudential debate among legal scholars, then to view some 
basic jurisprudential ideas as factors in international views of "law," and finally to reach the question of the 
operative difference a study of these theories might make in world politics. 
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 [pg257]** International law is studied these days in the real context of international 
politics,FN1 but jurisprudence—or theories about law—tends to be studied in a vacuum. 
Jurisprudence may be one step removed from law itself, but does this mean that it is of purely 
theoretical interest? A political scientist has recently drawn a sharp distinction between "the 
most important aspect of the law—its operation in the international environment" and 
"jurisprudence per se.”FN2 Of course, part of the reason for the seeming remoteness of 
jurisprudence is the highly ramified and artificial atmosphere in which it is discussed by some 
scholars. Glanville Williams has called the entire history of jurisprudence a mere "verbal 
dispute," acknowledging however that "it requires perhaps some temerity to suggest that a 
discussion carried on over many generations has been wholly unreal."FN3 Professor 
Ehrenzweig characterizes jurisprudence as a "tragedy of waste," a "Great Name-calling," a 
battle between "truly great minds" fighting each other "in seemingly hostile 'schools' of thought, 
storming the heavens in their Tower of Babylon."FN4 We might be somewhat skeptical of 
Williams and Ehrenzweig, however, inasmuch as they are both legal scholars with their own 
pet jurisprudential theories.FN5 
 
 In this essay we shall be concerned with the real world relevance of theories of 
international law; that is, with the question of the theories themselves as a factor in international 
decision-making. To do this it is first necessary to review briefly the substance of the 
jurisprudential debate among legal scholars, then to view some basic jurisprudential ideas as 
factors in international views of "law," and finally to reach [pg258] the question of the 
operative difference a study of these theories might make in world politics. 
 
I.THE VIEWPOINT OF THE LEGAL SCHOLAR 
 
 Legal scholars have traditionally concerned themselves with discovering "the" meaning 
of law and the necessary preconditions for its "validity." Classically this endeavor has led to the 
construction of grandiose logical theories to which empirical instances of laws had to conform 
at the expense of otherwise being declared invalid by the theorist. To John Austin, for example, 
law is a command backed by sanction; without these elements, an alleged rule of law is not 
"really" law. Thus at one stroke he consigned all international law to the dust heap of "positive 
morality" since it did not conform to his domestic-law model.FN6 To St. Thomas, law is the 
reflection of right reason; all laws which do not conform, even if they happen to be commands 
backed by sanction, are presumably invalid. Professor H.L.A. Hart today would argue that if 
there is no "rule of recognition" enabling us to distinguish laws from other standards of social 
conduct, there is no "law."FN7 Not quite wanting to dismiss international law in the way Austin 
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did, Professor Hart argues that the international legal system is "primitive" and hopefully on its 
way toward acquiring its own rule of recognition.FN8 And Professor Lon L. Fuller might rejoin 
that rules of recognition are not enough: law is not "law" if it does not aspire to regulate its own 
procedures for definition and promulgation according to standards of clarity, consistency, and 
even morality.FN9 The counterparts of all these theories can be found in abundance in writings 
addressed specifically to international law, from the positivism of Oppenheim and Kelsen to the 
naturalism of Lauterpacht and Brierly to the eclecticism of Schwarzenberger and most of the 
American scholars.FN10 
 
 If we stand at some distance away from these theories, refusing to be drawn in to the 
fascinating consideration of their intrinsic merits, we may find that their existence is not at all 
irrelevant to our assessment of the function of law among nations, though the relevance may 
[pg259] be of a kind not thought of by the jurisprudential theorists themselves. First, we must 
disavow the basic premise of these theorists that law has a discoverable single meaning. Any 
word, including the word "law," carries with it a set of dictionary denotations (not all of which 
are always logically consistent inter se) and a spectrum of usage connotations ranging from 
popular stereotypes to all kinds of questionable uses, and even misuses or witty uses (such as 
puns). Any attempt by any writer to fasten upon a single meaning, or majority meaning, or best 
meaning, of any word is likely only to add to the permissible connotations and eventually 
denotations of the word (if the writer becomes widely read). 
 
 Since it is a fact that some writers, particularly positivists such as Austin and Hart, have 
had trouble with the term "law" in the phrase "international law," we can conclude that for most 
people the term "law" probably connotes domestic "laws"—those duly enacted by legislatures 
or promulgated by dictators. Indeed, most people only have experience with domestic laws; 
public international law is outside the ambit of their connotative acquaintance. It was only 
natural, therefore, that some writers would seize upon the salient characteristics of domestic 
law, label that "real" law, and then proceed to call international law fictitious since it lacks a 
central legislature or pervasive judicial system or other features of the law to which people are 
accustomed.  
 
 We might, just for a moment and to demonstrate the relativity of verbal behavior, 
imagine that the situation were reversed and that international law was the everyday experience 
of most people while domestic law was the rare occurrence. Then self-styled "positivists" might 
arise who would proclaim that domestic law is merely "positive morality" since in order for it to 
be obeyed the state must use coercive police machinery, pervasive judicial systems with 
penalties for disobedience, and enactment by the ritual of a legislature supposedly representing 
the popular will. None of these are necessary for the true international law, they might add; 
international law is obeyed because it genuinely meets the interests of all concerned and fairly 
represents the consensus of its subjects. 
 
 In the grade schools, we were all taught to "define our terms" before proceeding to use 
them in an essay. But it is precisely such an attempt to define "law" that starts students of 
jurisprudence off on the wrong foot. Rather, what we should do is to attempt to understand the 
ways in which others use or even misuse the term. And even this is not an end in itself, for we 
would like to proceed to discover what [pg260] similarities of factorial constants attend the use 
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of the term in varying contexts. And finally, our aim is to understand how these factors convey 
structured sets of expectations from one context to another and thus influence those who use the 
terms to communicate to one another. 
 
 Thus, with respect to international law, we should attempt to discover the connotative 
expectations engendered by the use of the term "law" primarily in the domestic context when 
the same term is applied to intrastate relations. Of course, we are not interested solely in the 
phrase "international law," but rather that phrase and all the cognate terms and procedures 
associated with it. For it is not simply the application of the single term "international law" to 
international relations that enables us to talk about legal concepts in the international arena; 
rather, an entire body of legal procedures, terminology, analogies, and the like are habitually 
used in diplomatic discourse and international claim-conflict situations. H.LA. Hart has 
correctly referred to the "range of principles, concepts, and methods which are common to both 
municipal and international law, and make the lawyers' technique freely transferable from the 
one to the other."FN11 
 
 Professor Chayes was appointed Legal Adviser to the Department of State by President 
Kennedy even though Chayes had absolutely no experience in international law. He obviously 
had no trouble adjusting to his new job, and turned in a widely-acclaimed performance. Nearly 
all states have as their counsel in foreign affairs lawyers who were educated in the states' 
domestic systems and who passed local bar examinations, and it is only natural to see these men 
using their domestic legal concepts in international discourse. Any glance at a collection of 
state papers will immediately reveal the preponderance of legal terminology and argumentation 
used in international discourse—with, one might add, hardly ever a doubt raised as to whether 
what is being discussed is really "law." 
 
II. JURISPRUDENTIAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH "LAW" 
 
 Since we are not chasing after a single meaning for the term "law" nor attempting to 
define for eternity the preconditions of legal validity, we are free to take account of all of the  
well-known jurisprudential theories as representative of what scholars have at different times 
thought were necessary components of the concepts of legality. Although we are not directly 
interested in what the scholars themselves thought, their theories are significant because they 
have been [pg261] communicated to lawyers, statesmen, diplomatic representatives, and others 
concerned with international politics in the educational process and through legal socialization. 
 
 One of the main jurisprudential ideas, though not amounting to a "school" in itself, is 
the insistence that law is something that is backed up by sanctions. Though the idea stems from 
Austin, it has been most consistently applied to international law by Hans Kelsen. In Kelsen's 
view, modalities of social and political influence accomplished by persuasion, "setting a good 
example," or the promise of reward, are all non-legal. Law comes into the picture only when a 
"threat of evil", consisting of depriving the individual of life, freedom, property, or other 
values, is the basis of inducing the individual to behave in the desired manner.FN12 It would 
appear that with such a rigorous notion of "law," Kelsen would want to avoid the concept of 
international law and stick to certain kinds of domestic law where sanctions are easily 
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pinpointed. Yet he does deal extensively with international law, not without a good deal of 
difficulty. 
 
 Kelsen would like, for example, to think of wars as the sanction for illegal aggression, 
yet the "threat or use of force" itself has been outlawed by article 2, paragraph 2 of the United 
Nations.  He tries to meet this obstacle by arguing that the collective will of the international 
community, acting through the Security Council, may use force to combat aggression; article 2 
only prohibited individual states from doing so. Yet as Professor Robert W. Tucker, editor of 
Kelsen's second edition, recognizes, the veto power in the Security Council is an effective 
barrier to this reasoning, particularly when one of the permanent members itself is guilty of 
aggression and uses its veto to stop other states from interfering. Tucker's way out of this 
quandary is to enlarge the inherent right of states to self-defense, but before he is through the 
enlargement encompasses anticipatory self-defense which in the nuclear age is hard to 
distinguish from preemptive aggression.FN13 
 
 Unless one counts himself among the devoted followers of Kelsen, perhaps the best 
thing that can be said for Kelsen's single-track theory is that it occasionally leads to brilliant 
briefs for a point of view. But if we step outside the jurisprudential arena, we can recognize in 
Kelsen's theory the deep importance of having sanctions behind some [pg262] laws. Unless 
some laws are occasionally enforced, respect for laws might break down completely.FN14 In 
the international arena, though most of the laws are well-rooted in the self-interest of the states, 
it is still important that some transgressions be punished and that some effective threats of 
sanctions be made in some situations. 
 
 To insist that an alleged legal rule is not “law” or not legally "valid" unless it itself is 
backed by a threat of sanction, is to insist that one connotation of the term “law” is the only 
possible one and that everyone else who has used the term differently has been in error. But in  
the domestic legal system, to pick the hardest example, “law” and legal terminology are often 
used when there is no possibility of sanction. When the Supreme Court declared President 
Truman's seizure of the steel mills unconstitutional, it had no means of enforcing its decree. 
When the Court of Claims decides against the government in favor of a private contractor, it too 
has no means at its disposal for making Congress comply (and in approximately a dozen cases 
since the Court of Claims was established, the government in fact did not comply with the 
judgments against it).FN15 Yet everyone agrees that the Court of Claims applies "the law," and 
that when the Supreme Court handles constitutional issues its decisions have "legal 
validity."FN16 
 
 Or take even the paradigm of the domestic legal system in the eyes of positivists such as 
Austin and Holmes: the lowly criminal law proceeding. Here the positivists have looked at the 
law from the bad man's point of law, and of course to him law is a collection of rules the 
transgression of which entails varying probabilities of sanction. But what happens when the 
criminal is cleared of the charges by a judge or jury? If the police and the prosecutor are 
nevertheless convinced of the criminal's guilt, what is the legal sanction that stops them from 
punishing the criminal anyway? They represent, after all, the enforcement arm of the state, the 
dispensers of sanctions, and the reason they typically refrain from punishing acquitted criminals 
is hard to relate to a Kelsenian notion of threatened deprivations. Nor is it persuasive to try to 
5 
 
get around this by enlarging the notion of "sanction" to include displeasure of one's superiors, 
enmity of one's colleagues, or hostile public opinion. Similarly unpersuasive is the analogue of 
this in international law, where Kelsen at times appears to be suggesting that ”world public 
opinion" is a sanction that makes some kinds of [pg263] international rules valid. For the 
adoption of this kind of argument in the first place breaks down the initial distinction Kelsen 
made between persuasion and threat of evil; if an aroused public's anger at the district attorney 
render other decisions he makes illegal (such as "sanction," so too would all other instances of 
the public's anger at the decision not to prosecute an alleged criminal whom he is convinced is 
innocent). And, in the second place, the use of ideas such as "world public opinion" for a legal 
sanction is tantamount to a tautology: the public is upset because someone broke the law, and 
that in turn defines what he did as law-breaking. 
 
 A second strand in jurisprudential reasoning is typified in Holmes' dictum that "the 
prophecies of what the courts will do ... are what I mean by the law."FN17 This too has a great 
surface appeal and has seemed to many to be the sine qua non of any conceivable definition of 
legality. Of course, it is quite removed from the Austinian view of law as a command issuing 
from a sovereign; Austin was thinking of legislatures and kings whereas Justice Holmes was 
court-oriented. Holmes' answer to this was that sovereigns can enact laws, but until the courts 
pass upon their legality by enforcing them or refusing to enforce them, they have not yet been 
proved to be true laws. But the difficulty with this view is that while it may apply in large part 
in the United States, there are many countries without a strong tradition of judicial review in 
which sovereigns habitually pass laws and enforce them, and sometimes enforce them against 
the wishes of judges. To say that these are not "laws" again is to deny the empirical basis of 
language and communications. 
 
 And even in the United States, a great many laws are made by administrative agencies 
and enforced by them, with only limited "judicial review" in rare instances. Additionally, 
Congress makes the "laws" defining the jurisdiction of lower courts and a goodly portion of the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction as well. Finally, although the courts get to pass on the validity of 
some laws, the percentage of cases reaching the courts out of the totality of law-applications is 
miniscule, and the percentage of decisions against constitutionality is trivially small. The great 
bulk of compliance with law, and the biggest portion of enforcement in cases of non-
compliance, never get passed upon by courts. If Holmes looks at what courts might do, his 
vision would take in only a narrow portion of the legal activity going on in the United States.  
In international law, the situation is far more drastic. The International Court of Justice gets 
about one case per year out of the [pg264] thousands of claim-conflict situations that annually 
take place among states in their international relations. Arbitral tribunals are occasionally 
constituted, but these too account only for a tiny fraction of the legal business. Nevertheless, 
many scholars and international jurists devote the bulk of their efforts to a study of international 
tribunals or "case law." They often plead that the jurisdiction of the World Court be enlarged so 
that the rule of law may truly prevail. Typically they tend to avoid studying the vast effect of 
the United Nations on international law, the proliferation of multilateral conventions and 
international agencies of all sorts, and the day-to-day bargaining of foreign offices taking one 




 A somewhat related fallacy, though less harmful, is the position taken by many scholars 
that one should think of international law as something which a hypothetical court might decide 
if it were given jurisdiction in an international dispute. The trouble here is that if a court were 
given such jurisdiction, the dispute itself would probably not have arisen in the way it did; the 
opposing contentions would have initially been structured in a different manner in order to take 
account of the presence of a judicial body capable of rendering an authoritative judgment. 
 
 Nevertheless, the insistence by some scholars on the importance of judicial activity in 
international law must not be overlooked. The very presence of their theories in the 
jurisprudential debate signifies the weight often attached to courts in any legal system. The 
mere presence of a World Court, even if its docket is singularly uncrowded, adds 
authoritativeness to the entire legal system which nearly everyone calls "international law." 
 
 A variation on the Holmesian view of law, which might constitute a third strand in the 
literature of jurisprudence, was suggested by Llewellyn in The Bramble Bush: "What officials 
do about disputes is ... the law itself."FN18 By focusing on the broader term "officials," this 
view would encompass decisions by administrative agencies, legislators, arbitrators, kings, 
policemen, bureaucrats, embassy officials, and so forth, including of course judges. Similarly, 
by adopting a sufficiently broad definition of the term "disputes" so that it would include all 
instances where law is applied (i.e., potential disputes that are avoided by compliance), the idea 
comes fairly close to encompassing many of the denotations and connotations of the term "law" 
in public discourse. 
 
 On the other hand, this single-factored view, like the others previously discussed, has its 
pitfalls. What if officials act illegally? They [pg265] may get away with it, but everyone would 
still say that their actions were illegal—except Llewellyn, who would have to say that their 
actions constitute "the law." If Llewellyn were to attempt to answer this by adding the 
qualification, "law is what officials do when they act legally," the statement would be a patent 
tautology. Yet something of this tautology lurks in the original definition, for the term 
"officials" seems to suggest lawfulness and authority. To this extent, of course, Llewellyn's 
definition is devoid of informational content. Nevertheless, it does convey an important 
psychological insight into the legal system—that officials by and large must themselves act 
legally if they are to retain their authority. 
 
 Perhaps Professor McDougal may be classified within this third jurisprudential position 
in his writings on international law. To him, law is a "comprehensive process of authoritative 
decision."FN19 This is an extremely appealing viewpoint insofar as the study of international 
law is concerned, for it avoids the narrow emphasis on judge-made law and enables scholars to 
view international law in a much more realistic perspective. Authoritative decision-makers, in 
McDougal's view, clearly include "nation-state officials" who alternatively are claimants on 
behalf of their own states and "decision-makers assessing the claims of others."FN20 Surely 
their actions are an important datum of the content of international norms—the norms that are 
really applied in day-to-day conflict situations and not transcendental norms that may never 
have been applied since Grotius, or that are only applied when and if the World Court gets 




 Yet, if we take a closer look at McDougal's definition, we find in it the same hidden 
tautology as the one just suggested with respect to Llewellyn's "officials." The term 
"authoritative" decision in McDougal's definition tends to beg the question. What makes the 
decision "authoritative" if not some prior conception of legality? Yet if there is such a prior 
conception, then law cannot be defined as the "process of authoritative decision." Of course, 
this would be just a harmless semantic quibble if McDougal stopped here. But he goes on quite 
consistently, applying the tautology in all of his prolific writings on international law. The 
result is that his view of "law" becomes extremely broad, taking in apparently everything that 
nation-state officials do (or at least, as Professor Falk has suggested, everything that [pg266] 
non-Soviet nation-state officials do.FN21). McDougal delights in this breadth; to him, policy 
and law are interchangable, and he would like to see legal techniques applied in every aspect of 
foreign-policy decision-making. McDougal at times seems to recognize a distinction between 
"classical" rules of international law and current policy alternatives, but these classical rules, he 
says in a footnote, "exhaust their effective power when they guide a decision-maker to relevant 
factors and indicate presumptive weightings."FN22 Since it is unlikely that classical rules of 
law will indicate any "relevant factors" that a decision-maker will not already have thought of, 
these rules in McDougal's scheme become just another set of alternative policy lines. This again 
is fully consistent with his view of international law, for it accords the lawyer a central role in 
the making of policy. In an essay jointly authored with Professor Lasswell, McDougal stated 
that "the lawyer is today, even when not himself a maker of policy, the one indispensable 
adviser of every responsible policy-maker of our society."FN23 Since the identification of 
policy alternatives is a prime talent of the lawyer in McDougal's view,FN24 it is little wonder 
that international law to McDougal is just a collection of data that is part of the lawyer's 
equipment and subject to changes in content according to the most recent policy decisions of 
nation-state officials. 
 
 The obvious reply to this view of "international law" is that it is so broad as to destroy 
the concept of law as a restraint on the behavior of decision-makers. McDougal might well 
reply that in his view there is no such "international law" that effectively restrains 
decision-makers from doing what they would do anyway, a position that accords with that of 
the "realist" school in the political science of foreign policy. But, again, it clashes with other 
people's views of "international law." Not everyone believes that national officials are totally 
unrestrained in their policy choices, or that "law" does nothing more than indicate to them some 
of a range of policy alternatives. And in any event, such a thesis must be examined 
independently by a psychological study of the behavior of national officials. It certainly cannot 
be resolved by adopting an overly broad definition of "international law" when such a definition 
conflicts with many of the ideas and concepts most people associated with the notion of "law." 
 
 Finally, a fourth line of reasoning in jurisprudence deserves our attention, not only 
because it is one of the oldest approaches but also [pg267] because of its current vitality: the 
idea of "morality" in the law. This is part of the natural law tradition—the "right reason" of St. 
Thomas, the moral duties and prohibitions of the Stoics.FN25 Extremists who take this 
position—and this includes some street demonstrators in the United States today—argue that 
any given law is invalid unless it coincides with the dictates of morality, that one's moral duty is 
to resist immoral "laws" for the latter are not really "laws."  
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 More moderate is Professor Fuller, the leading representative of the natural law school: 
if all the laws of a legal system violate moral standards (as he attempts to define them), then 
they are not really "laws" and the public need not obey any of them.FN26 On this issue Fuller 
takes exception to Hart's view that the laws of the Nazi regime were true "laws"; Hart would 
concede that they were laws and argue that the people should resist them on the grounds of 
morality, while Fuller argues that because of their secrecy, ambiguity, retrospective application, 
and so forth, they were not really "laws" at all.FN27 Again, this issue cannot be resolved by the 
stipulation of definitions; on the particular question, one must resort to an empirical study of the 
way the term "law" was used by the Germans and what they would have responded if asked 
whether the Nazi laws were "true" laws. Of course this is now, and probably was at the time, a 
non-researchable proposition. Yet the question is not simply one of semantics; a great deal can 
turn on popular acceptation of rules as "legal" or "illegal."  
 
 Hart is not quite correct in arguing that people should accept commands of the central 
government as "law" even if they intend to resist them on moral grounds,FN28 for to most 
people this would raise a considerable barrier to resistance. The very fact that something is 
"law" carries with it a good deal of moral pressure. An extreme example may be found in the 
lowly traffic ordinances: most people would refrain from speeding on a totally deserted 
highway or going through a red light in a deserted town at 4 a.m. on the ground that it is not 
"right" to disobey these laws. Moreover, there are several laws that many people think are 
immoral (laws protecting the freedom of speech of Communists, or income taxation in the 70% 
bracket!), but these are nevertheless obeyed because "the law requires it." 
 
 In international law, it is hard to find many laws which are related in one way or another 
to "morality:' Most of the norms are of the [pg268] traffic-ordinance variety. There are some 
which are claimed to be "moral," such as the alleged rule against expropriation without 
compensation, but this is clearly morality of Western capitalist origin and does not fully accord 
with the views of many states, as the United States Supreme Court itself fully admitted.FN29 
However, there are some rules which do intersect with substantive morality—the norm 
prohibiting traffic in slaves (which was once quite the opposite, as the Supreme Court once 
heldFN30), the rules against the use of poisonous gases in warfare or the maltreatment of 
prisoners of war, and rules ensuring the safety of diplomatic representatives, to mention some 
of them. Moreover, the increasing trend toward the enactment of multilateral conventions 
setting up agencies to provide for international social and economic welfare legislation, as well 
described by Professor Coplin FN31 may help to enhance the moral aura of international law in 
general. Finally, it would be foolish of any international lawyer to discount moral factors in 
arguing before international tribunals or attempting to persuade opponent national officials; the 
appeal to morality, while often insufficient if standing alone, usually enhances the legitimacy 
and acceptability of a legal presentation that is not 100% persuasive standing alone. 
 
 To summarize matters as they stand at this point, we have seen that although it is not 
productive to force one's concept of law into any of the four rigid molds discussed, each of 
them contributes to our understanding of international law and the way it operates in the 
international environment. The first idea, that of sanctions behind the law, reminds us that many 
people take a "bad man's" viewpoint in insisting that no rule is binding unless it carries with it a 
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threat of deprivation. Any international procedure for strengthening the "sanction" element of 
law may therefore contribute to the authoritativeness of the entire legal system. 
 
 Second, we are reminded by the Holmesian view of law as a prediction of judicial 
behavior that an important element in the popular idea of international law is the presence of 
international judicial tribunals. Even if such tribunals are denied the "big" cases, by increasing 
their jurisdiction over "little" cases we may add to the authoritativeness of international law in 
the minds of the concerned national [pg269] officials as well as the general public. The more 
judicial activity one sees, the more "legal" a system may look if one is used to a domestic legal 
system having a high incidence of court activity. Moreover, the more "little" cases handled by 
tribunals, the more likely is the general impression that the smooth handling of little cases is 
preventing many of them growing into big cases—or in other words that the "law" is doing its 
job. 
 
 Third, Llewellyn's idea of law as the prediction of official behavior finds an important 
spokesman in Professor McDougal, whose idea of international law, though it may err on the 
side of breadth, at least helps us recognize that the relevant actors in most cases are national 
officials as they make claims and pass upon the claims of others, and not the fifteen judges 
sitting at The Hague or the nonexistent central legislators of the idealized world community of 
the "world peace through world law" school.  
 
 Fourth, the natural-law school of the interconnection of law and morals, which has 
found international-law spokesmen such as Brierly and Lauterpacht, underlines the increased 
sense of validity of "law" if some or many of the particular rules of law coincide with or 
reinforce generally accepted standards of morality. To argue for a sharp distinction between law 
and morals, as some positivists (and "realists" in political science) tend to do, is to take a 
position that conflicts with the admittedly fuzzy and not entirely consistent concepts associated 
with the idea of law and legal obligation in the minds of the actual members of legal systems. 
 
III. WHAT OPERATIVE DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? 
 
 If a study of theories of jurisprudence only yielded either a more careful approach to 
terminology and definitions, or some prescriptions that help increase the rule of international 
law in world affairs, it would be of limited value in analyzing the current role of international 
law in international relations. Thus it is necessary to proceed to a consideration of the latter. In 
doing so, it will be seen that the preceding jurisprudential themes are vitally connected with the 
analysis of the operative effect of international law. 
 
 International law, it may safely be said at the outset, is inseparable from international 
politics conceived as the study of the influence and control of national behavior. Professor 
Deutsch recently gave a general definition of politics as the "more or less incomplete control of 
human behavior through voluntary habits of compliance in combination with [pg270] threats of 
probable enforcement. FN32 This is very close to a description of international law. The latter 
is made up largely of voluntary state habits of compliance, termed international customary law, 
in combination with threats of probable enforcement (usually the threats predominate over the 
instances of actual enforcement). The result is a loose international legal system, made up of 
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rules, legal procedures of doing things, standard legal ways of making international claims and 
phrasing diplomatic notes, and a rough consensus as to permitted modes of legal persuasion. 
Examples of the latter include the idea of reciprocity, the strong deference given to opinions of 
the International Court of Justice, and the roughly shared ideas of the limits to which a state 
may go in acts of retorsion and reprisal. 
 
 Most of the substantive rules of the international legal system are in the direct self-
interest of the member states. The rules give great deference to physical boundaries and 
borders, to vital security interests of the states, to relatively easy intercommunication (via the 
laws of diplomatic exchanges), to the minimal security of tourists and aliens, and increasingly 
to the development of oceanic and outer space resources for the general welfare of all the states. 
Of course there are specific instances of rules not in a certain state's interest: Japan, for 
example, does not have a continental shelf and thus has been unhappy with the rule that coastal 
states have the right of exploitation over continental shelves. But although Japan would prefer a 
res communis policy of the continental shelf, she has other state interests that are secured by 
other rules of international law and has chosen to support the rules as a whole by not objecting 
too strenuously to a particular rule that she does not like.FN33 
 
 One could not begin to describe the nature of the international political system without 
referring to the rules of international law that stake out national jurisdictions and deal with 
situations where opposing states have conflicts of claims over the same geographic area or 
physical or human resource. Professor Coplin has well described the function of international 
law as "an authoritative institution for the communication and development of a consensus on 
the nature of [international] society.”FN34 Previously, Professor McDougal had described 
international rules as serving the function of "communicat[ing] the perspectives (demands, 
identifications, and expectations) of the peoples of the world" about the prevention of 
unauthorized coercion [pg271] and the promotion of optimum order and welfare through the 
common exploitation of resources.FN35 In short, one could not describe the operation of power 
in the international environment without taking into account the institutionalization of power as 
defined by the rules of international law which lay down the jurisdictional competences of 
states.  
 
 Yet simply to describe the international system by cataloguing the rules of international 
law (and a number of other rules as well) is only a first step toward the understanding of 
international patterns of influence. The larger question is: can the laws be manipulated to aid or 
thwart any given nation from increasing its proportion of political influence or allocation of 
world resources?  
 
 The question forces us to leave the security of pontifications in books stating what the 
current rules of international law are, to proceed to a psychological investigation of the 
operative force of rules of international law in the minds of the relevant world actors. 
International law is like any other law in that it must be conveyed to, and understood by, those  
who are to be influenced by it. What counts is not what some scholar in a book or article says 
the law "really is," but what national decision-makers and their advisers think the law is. 




 We may safely assume that national decision-makers have various stereotypes in their 
minds about what "law" is as well as various opinions as to their own rights and duties under 
whatever laws they feel themselves subject. It is also likely, though not always true, that 
national decision-makers are primarily experienced in their own domestic legal system. As 
private citizens they are subject to traffic ordinances, laws defining the marital status, laws 
about the payment of taxes and so forth. Moreover, as government officials, they usually  
perceive the importance of domestic law in securing their own jobs. If officials subordinate to 
them obey their laws, then they are relatively secure. If the public obeys the law, insurrection is 
less likely. One of the ways they can help create an atmosphere of law-obedience is to  
set an example in the way they behave—at least, in the way they behave publicly. By 
demonstrating a scrupulous regard for "the law", they help condition others to obey them.FN36 
 
 When they, as their nation's representatives, enter into a dispute with their counterparts 
from another nation, one of the first things [pg272] they will ask their legal counsel is "Does 
international law say anything about this?" They will find that, in many disputes, international 
law has a great deal to say, though not always with clarity. But strategically they will not stop at 
the question just posed; they will go on to ask, "What do our opponents think international law 
says about this?" For they will be concerned primarily with the latter question. Their task, after 
all, is to persuade their opponents and win the dispute, not to be "true" to an abstract concept of 
international law. 
 
 Since they normally will not know exactly what their opponents think international law 
has to say about the matter, they will probably reason that their opponents, like themselves, 
have a great stake in abiding to law (at least publicly). They will also know, however, that their 
opponents may draw the line between domestic law and international law; they will feel far less 
of a compulsion to obey the latter. Nevertheless, their opponents, like themselves, may find it 
hard to separate the two legal systems entirely. As Festinger has pointed out generally, men 
tend to avoid the cognitive dissonance that results from adopting contradictory positions with 
respect to the same phenomenon.FN37 
 
 But is "law" the same domestically as internationally? The answer, a legal adviser might 
say, is that in some respects it is the same and in some respects it is different. But it is called the 
same thing, and that is an important "plus" on the side of similarity. Moreover, the lawyers' 
techniques that are used are essentially the same. The same general principles of equity appear 
to apply, and the same use of analogies and precedents that occur in domestic legal 
argumentation are found in state papers and diplomatic negotiations. Thus, the national 
decision-maker may conclude that his opposite number feels a certain pressure in the direction 
of conforming with the relevant international rule. This pressure of course does not tell  
the whole story; the opponent decision-maker may ignore the pressure and decide otherwise. 
But nevertheless the pressure is a factor to be taken into account, and in the absence of other 
information, a very important factor.  
 
 The importance of the pressure felt by national decision-makers to conform to 
international rules appears to have increased in a steady progression since the nineteenth 
century. This does not mean that [pg273] there have not been flagrant violations; but looking 
simply at the exceptions does not convey a true picture. International transactions, after all, 
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have increased with the advance of transportation, communication, and the number of states in 
the international arena. Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons has in recent times made it 
especially important that a nation appear not to be upsetting the status quo. (Domestic 
governments may be upset, but international events since the second world war have been 
remarkably stable. Most state boundaries, for example, have remained relatively the same.) 
 
 But the international status quo is itself a function of the relevant international rules 
defining jurisdictional competences of states. Thus a nation may appear to be an upholder of the 
status quo when it wraps itself in international legality, while the nation that appears to  
transgress international norms may appear to be the innovator. Since innovation can lead to 
escalatory exchanges, there is great pressure not to be an innovator. Or, if a nation must force 
through an international change, it will at least attempt to clothe its actions in the greatest 
possible coverings of international law.  
 
 Returning to our calculating national decision-maker, we can see that he will put a high 
premium on possible ways to persuade his opposite number that his own course of action is the 
legal and hence conservative one, that he is not asking for anything new but simply for his 
existing rights under the law. He will attempt to place the burden of explanation of innovation 
on the other side. In order to do this, he must make several other strategic calculations. He has 
to try to figure out what the other side really thinks the legal position is. Additionally, he has to 
try to figure out what the rest of the international community thinks the relevant legal 
considerations are, since either he or his opponent may sooner or later try to bring in outside 
help. Next, he has to put some qualitative estimate on the force of the particular international 
rule or rules that are relevant to the dispute. Some rules, after all, are clear; others are vague; 
some are clear but only recently established, while others are of a long and unquestioned 
duration. And finally, he has to estimate the other side's appreciation of the qualitative force of 
the rule, a task that is complex even if only because the other side will be expected to argue that 
the rule is really different or questionable. What he has to calculate is how much the other side 
really believes in the position it is taking. 
 
 This simple statement of the strategic considerations involved leads immediately to the 
observation that one side or the other will [pg274] often consciously be taking a position that it 
knows departs more from the relevant rule of international law than the other side's position. 
Then the question is, "Should we continue to press this point when we have the poorer case?" 
The dangers involved in doing so include the chance that third party states or neutral observers 
or the General Assembly of the United Nations will sooner or later say that the case is weaker 
than the opponent's. Another danger is that the opponent state may attempt to use force to back 
up its position, calculating that it is "in the right" and that its enemy is unreasonable. (By the 
use of force, the entire spectrum of retorsions is included, such as making things difficult for 
the other country's tourists, raising tariffs, withdrawing support at the U.N., and so forth.) The 
state thus insisting on an unreasonable or illegal position will then find itself the subject of 
retaliation on other issues, and if it in turn attempts to counter-retaliate the opponent state will 
say: "We only did it because you took what was obviously an illegal position on the initial 





 Because states have so many opportunities for inflicting all kinds of subtle degrees of 
harm on other states, we may conclude that the ability to take a position that is closer to 
"international law" with respect to any given dispute is itself a "plus" for the state taking that 
position. It shifts the burden of innovation to the opponent state, and if the opponent state goes 
ahead and innovates, the "law-abiding" state may retaliate in a manner that does not appear to 
other states to be escalatory but rather appears to be a fitting reprisal. This is not to say that the 
"plus" engendered by legality is the most significant factor in any given situation; often it is 
quite insignificant and cancelled by other factors. Often, too, international law is ambiguous on 
the subject and either side has an equally persuasive case. (However, even if the "law" itself is 
balanced, the abilities of the corresponding legal counsel usually are widely disparate, a fact 
that has played more than a small role in the successes the United States has achieved in the 
United Nations at the expense of the Soviet Union.) Yet, because international law and legal 
techniques are the media for international communications in most disputes, the legal factor 
seems always to be present; it is usually the starting-point in the calculations of the parties; and 
it often suffices to dispose of the issue, particularly in minor disputes. 
 
 Whatever the importance of the legal factor, it is something that is subject to a certain 
amount of intelligent manipulation; a nation cannot [pg275] change the amount of tonnage of 
its natural resources, but it might help restructure international expectations by changing 
international law. Of course it will attempt to "change" the law in any given dispute by 
argumentation, but that does not always work and is usually well understood by others as being 
"too late." It can participate in international codification conventions, other types of multilateral 
conventions, and in the work of the International Law Commission; the majority of states do as 
a matter of course. 
 
 More importantly, a nation should make its own strategic calculations whether it is in 
general better off because of international law or worse off because of it. Some new nations 
may genuinely feel that international law is stacked against them, and therefore they should not 
attempt to improve or strengthen it. On the other hand, a careful assessment of the pros and 
cons of existing rules of international law may convince the most unlikely states that obeying it 
is in their national interest. 
 
 South Africa, for example, is the subject of numerous condemnatory resolutions in the 
United Nations; it is watching the spectacle of what it feels are illegal mandatory economic 
sanctions against Rhodesia; it is continually attacked on legal grounds for its system of 
apartheid. Yet South Africa showed up in the World Court to contest the mandate over South 
West Africa, and in almost all matters it has adopted, internationally, a scrupulously correct 
attitude toward the rule of law.FN38 It is evident that South Africa feels that the basic rules of 
international law giving sovereignty to all states, protecting the borders of all states against 
illegal aggression, and generally excluding from the concern of international law things that go 
on wholly within the boundaries of a state affecting its own citizens,FN39 protect the continued 
existence of the present regime in South Africa much more than the slings and arrows of legal 
attacks on apartheid. 
 
 It is in general no cause for amazement that most if not all states will perceive that the 
plusses of international law for them outweigh the minusses. International law is the creation of 
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states, designed for their mutual self-interest. The people as a whole, or humanity in general, 
have no effective counter-lobby, and therefore they have to be content with the provisions of 
international law that help them while helping their governments. If in certain instances, such as  
[pg276] apartheid, international law as a whole helps the government more than the people, 
that is the price the people pay for the system. 
 
 If a state concludes that it is better off under an international legal system than being an 
international outlaw, it will undertake studies for the purpose of discovering how to manipulate 
to its advantage rules in the present system. It will also undertake to get some idea of the 
persuasiveness of rules on the decision-makers of other states. For it will be to a state's great 
advantage if it can make a good guess as to the persuasiveness of a legal position on an 
opponent and on uninvolved states. Unless a shrewd guess is made, a state will lose 
considerable bargaining advantage.  
 
 In all these calculations, national officials should take into account the classic 
jurisprudential underpinnings of international legality. The sanctions theory or the morality 
theory, for instance, may help a state enhance its own case, or help it to change rules by 
reinforcing desired ones along these lines and extinguishing others by withholding moral 
approbation or contingents from the U.N. peacekeeping force. More probably, an awareness of 
the jurisprudential arguments may assist a national decision-maker in calculating the weight of 
a rule of law as perceived by the opponent side. In such a calculation, one might assess the 
various weights of the jurisprudential theories in the domestic legal system of the opponent, and 
then relate these to the international argument being made.  
 
 An easy example of this would be to see if the opponent state has a domestic system that 
is characterized by a pervasive judiciary. If so, one might stress in international argumentation 
the relevant decisions of the World Court. (South Africa, for example, has a strong judicial 
system, and the arguments that seemed to score the hardest against her in the South West Africa 
Cases were those based on decisions of the World Court; on the other hand, South Africa was 
singularly unimpressed by arguments on an analogy to international legislation that would 
enhance the role of national decision-makers or the role of the United Nations.) If the opponent 
state has little domestic experiences with an independent judiciary, then one might stress 
internationally the rules contained in codification conventions or the rules found in some 
General Assembly resolutions. Similar examples could be adduced with respect to the role of 
moral arguments intersecting with legal ones, or the insistence on a clear rule specifying 
sanctions in the event of transgression. 
 
 Finally, if national decision-makers should make such calculations, we ought to analyze 
them as well. We should not view "law" as [pg277] a specialized thing, far off to one side and 
containing weird rules of its own. Rather, "law" is very close to being an expression of the 
attempt by one person or state to influence another. Since it is a well-known and often powerful 
force in this endeavor, we should adopt a multifactorial analysis of it. We should not say that 
something is or is not "law;" rather, we should try to see how others use or manipulate the term. 
We should not dismiss jurisprudential debates over the "meaning" of law as inconclusive; rather 
we should look at them to find empirical data as to some of the factors that enter into the 
multifactored concept of "law" and legal validity. Finally, in international politics, we should be 
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aware of the jurisprudential factors, among others, since they enter into the persuasiveness of 
policies that are couched in legal terminology. For it is clear that this kind of persuasiveness is 
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